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IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MONROE CITY,
)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
CHARLES L. ARNOLD, NORRIS K.
ARNOLD, and JON R. ARNOLD,
d/b/a ARNOLD HOG RANCH,
Defendants and Appellants.

j

Case No.
11,300

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF CASE
Action brought by a third class city to restrain and abate
operation of a commercial piggery within the city limits and
within a r,esidential area as a public nuisance.
DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT
District Court found the operation by the Defendants of
a commercial piggery within a residential area of Monroe
City to be a nuisanc.e and ordered the operation abated and
restrained.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff, Respondent here, seeks to have affirmed the
judgment and order of the District Court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action was filed by the Plaintiff in its capacity as a
third class city of the State of Utah to enjoin the operation
of a commercial piggery within the riesidential area of Monroe City. The piggery is operated on approximately two and
one half city lots, one block from main stre,et (T. 24, Line
9) 1, and located in a residential area (T. 19, Line 2). Up to
250 hogs are kept on the premis,es by the Defendants at one
time and in the calendar year of 1966 the Defendants sold
253 pigs for market (T. 124, Line 21). The operation is commercial and "to make money" (T. 99, Line 14). The size of
the piggery was incf\eased substantially over a period of
three years prior to the filing of the complaint. It was ex·
plained that the operation was expanded to provide the complete support for Charles L. Arnold after he had left other
employment (T. 8, Line 28).
The Defendants maintain a complete hog breeding and
feeding operation. The operation requires them to clean
pig pens and pile manure for some periods of time (T. 7,
Line through 4). In winter months the manure is piled
until spring when it can be taken out and put on a patch of
alfalfa which is on the same two and one half city lots (T.
102, Line 23). The operation requires the Defendants to
take measures to kill and collect dead flies by the wheelbarrow load (T. 12, Line 16, T. 18, Line 16, through 21). The
flies, together with the afterbirth taken from the farrowing
pigs and the smaller dead pigs and other refus.e is stored and
burned in a large barrel on the lot (T. 9, Line 7 through 16;
T. 9, Line 26 through 30; T. 12, Line 16; T. 18, Line 16
through 21). The hog farrowing pens used by the sows
hav.e cement floors which are washed down periodically and
all of the manure, urine, and other debris is soaked down
and washed from the pens on to the lot (T. 22, Line 11; T.
23, Line 3 through 6).
1

Citations are to R,eporter's Transcript pages.
2

Witnesses in the residential area describe the odors coming from the piggery as obnoxious and nauseating. Neighbors testified that it made it impossible for them to go out
doors for any length of time and the condition is exceedingly embarrassing for them on occasions when friends or
relatives visit their homes (T. 27, Line 15 through 24; T. 28,
Line 8; T. 30, Line 9; T. 39, Line 20; T. 54, Line 7 through
9; T. 54, Line 27 through 28, and etc.). Neighbors testified
that the noise. from the piggery and from the squealing
hogs caused them to be awakened several times each night
(T. 28, Line 21; T. 47, Line 22 through 30). The manure,
and on some occasions dead pigs buried in the manur.e pile,
was offensive to sight (T. 31, Line 5 through 12).
The Defendant Charles L. Arnold was called as the first
witness and examined. He acknowledged the commercial
nature of the piggery and admitted that it was solely for his
support (T. 8, Line 28); that the piggery operation had increased substantially over the past thr.ee years (T. 8, Line
9 through 30). He also stated that he was the sole operator
and in charge of running the complete operation (T. 13,
Line 24 through 27). On cross examination, Counsel for the
D.ef.endant offered Defendant's Exhibit "A", a Warranty
Deed, showing the conveyance of the property from Charles
L. Arnold to his sons, Norris K. Arnold and Jon R. Arnold.
Objection was made to the immateriality of the .exhibit (T.
13, Line 12 through 30). Counsel for Defendant then rais.ed
the question of "who was the real party in interest" (T. 14,
Line 4 through 15). The objection to the exhibit was sustained and Mr. Barkier made a proffer of proof (T. 15, Line
19). He stated that the property had been transferred to
the sons in the year of 1967, the year of the filing of the
complaint. The Court took a r,ecess and discuss.ed the matter with counsel in Chambers. It was acknowledged by Mr.
Barker, Attorney for the Defendants, a n d by Defendant,
Norris K. Arnold, that he had been employ ed by Norri·s K.
Arnold and Jon R. Arnold to def.end the matter (T. 135, Line
19 through 28). It was also acknowledged in Chambers by
1
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Mr. Barker that his defense would be substantially the same
if the additional parties were joined and that his preparation and exhibits would be the same (Findings of Fact No.
2 and 3). Upon motion of the Plaintiff, the Court ordered
Norris K. Arnold and Jon R. Arnold added as Defendants in
their partnership capacity as Arnold Hog Ranch. Both Defendants were present in Court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
MONROE CITY HAS THE POWER AND OBLIGATION
TO ABATE OR ENJOIN A NUISANCE.
Monroe City is a city of third class in the State of Utah.
It derives its powers as a subdivision of the State of Utah
by specific legislative enactment. The legislature has adopted the following two statutes which have granted Monroe City the power to abate a nuisance:
"Section 10-8-60, Utah Code Annotated, 1953:
They may declare what shall be a nuisance, and
abate the same, and impose fines upon persons who
may create, continue or suffer nuisances to exist.
Section 10-8--67, Utah Code Annotated, 1953:
Pigsties, privies-Prohibiting ,establishment. They
may prohibit any offensive, unwholesome business
or establishment in and within one mile of the limits
of the corporation, compel the owner of any pigsty,
privy, barn, corral, sewer, or other unwholesome or
nauseous house or place to cleanse, abate or remove
the same, and may regulat.e the location ther,eof ."
The foregoing ,emphasis by underlining has been added
by us.
The general rule concerning whether a municipal corporation may be a party plaintiff seeking injunctive relief has
been stated in Section 281, Municipal Corporations, in Vol4

ume 62 of Corpus Juris Secundum, at Page 632.
follows:

It is as

"As a g,eneral rule a m u n i c i p a l corporation may
maintain an equitable action or a proceedings in the
nature thereof to aid in compelling the abatement of
a nuisance. A municipality may sue in equity to
compel the abatement of a nuisance affecting matters confided to it in its governmental capacity although it has suffe1:1ed no special damages therefor
and equitable relief may also be obtained in the
name of the municipal corporation because of special injury, either to property owned by the corporation or to property to which it stands in a trust relation for the benefit of the public."
It is clearly apparent from the cited legislation found in
Title 10 of Utah Code Annotated, 1953, that municipalities
of the state are giv,en the obligation and authority to take
some action to regulate nuisances and also to "abate the
same". A city has the alternative of providing by ordinance a system of regulation and fines in criminal proceedings. It also has the right to seek the powers of a court for
a mor.e complete relief2.

The need for equitable relief in the present case is clear.
The City could proceed against one or more of the Defondants and charge them with maintaining a nuisance and imCJS. Injunctions, Sec. 124, Vol. 43, p. 671:
"Acts which are a menaoe to the public health or safety, or,
as sometimes stated in greater detail, acts which are dangerous to human life, detrimental to public health, and the
occasion of great public inconvenience and damage, may be
enjoined. The power to issue an injunction in these circumstances belongs to the general powers poss.essed by courts
of equity, and is also conferred by some statutes applicable
to various situations or matters, and a municipality is authorized to sue for an injunction to prevent or restrain the
violation of municipal polioe and sanitary regulations by a
constitutional provision authorizing municipalities to enforce such regulations.
2
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pose a fine on them. This relief would be temporary and
possibly arbitrary. The City is in need of an adjudication
as to whether or not the condition complained of is a nuisance and also an injunction which will reHeve the inhabitants of the problem.
In an action brought in the State of California for injunctive relief against the keeping of 5 hogs as a public nuisance, P.eople vs. Johnson, 277 P2d 45, the Court reaffirmed
the language in the cas.e of the City of Stockton vs. Frisbey
and Latta, 93 C. A. 277, 270 P 270, it was held that where
the personal welfare and property rights of a large number
of the inhabitants of a city or town would be detrimentally
affected by the violation of a police or sanitary r·egulation,
whether the ordinance provides other means for its enforcement or not, such city or town may itself appeal to a court
of equity by means of the forceful and singularly effective
Writ of Injunction to restrain such violation or to cause the
wrongful effect thereof to be removed.
We believe the reasoning of the California cases cited as
well as cases from many other jurisdictions where cities
have brought actions to enjoin a nuisance is not only persuasive but controlling. Some additional cases from other
jurisdictions where cities hav,e maintained actions for injunctive relief are: Colorado-Echove vs. Grants Junction,
193 P2d 277; Kansas City Br,ewery vs. Kansas City, 193 P
523; New Mexico-Town of Gallop vs. Constant, 11 P2d 962.
The evidence appears to be overwhelming and undisputed
that the piggery maintained by the Arnold Hog Ranch personnel does constitute a public nuisance. It affects residents
of Monroe City for a considerable distance from the hog
ranch. In addition, it affects and is riepulsive to persons
traveling or walking on public streets near the piggery. The
stench coming f r o m the hog farm was characterized as
"sour", "nauseating", "terrible", "sickening", and on occasions so bad that it was impossible to get out of doors in
ar.eas near the piggery.
6

Utah Statutes define a public nuisance. Although the
statutes are criminal in natur.e, they do set a minimum
standard which has been imposed by the Utah Legislature
for the conduct of persons within the state. They are applicable here and in the same manner violations of the motor
vehicles are applicable to show that a motorist has breached
the standard of duty he owes to the public when a violation
of one of the statutes is found.
Under Section 78.-38-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, "Nuisance" Defined - Right of Action for - Judgment:
"Anything which is injurious to health, or indecent,
or offensive to the senses. or an obstruction to the
free use of property, so as to interf.ere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, is a nuisance
and the subject of an action. Such action may be
brought by any person whose property is injuriously
affected, or whose p,ersonal enjoyment is lessened by
nuisance; and by the judgment the nuisance may be
enjoined or abated, and damages may also be recovered." (emphasis added).
It is s,een that a right of action is granted against any
person who maintains a condition which is in j u r i o u s to
health, or indecent, or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property.

The offense complained of against the Arnold piggery
dearly falls within this definition. It is classified as a nuisance which the city has an obligation to abate or prohibit.
The legislatur.e then has enacted Section 76-43-3, "Public
Nuisance'' defined:
"A public nuisance is a crime against the order and
economy of the state, and consists in lawfully doing
any act, or omitting to perform any duty, which act
or omission either:
(1) Annoys, injures or endangers the comfort, repose, health, or saf,ety of three or more persons ; or
(2) Offends public decency; or
7

(3) Unlawfully interferes with, obstructs or tends
to obstruct, or renders dangerous for passage, any
lake, stream, canal or basin, or any public park,
square, street or highway; or
( 4) In any way rienders three or more persons insecure in life or the use of property."
We think no additional argument is needed concerning
the definition of public nuisance since the statutes cited
g.enerally follow the common law and citations from cases
from other jurisdictions concerning common law nuisances
would not be helpful to the Court. An informative annotation is found under title "Nuisance-Keeping Pigs" in 2
ALR3d 933. Some of the cases cited have found keeping of
pigs in a city to he a nuisance per se.
POINT II
THE COURT CORRECTLY ADDED ADDITIONAL
PARTIES DURING THE COURSE OF TRIAL.
The complaint of the Plaintiff was filed against Charles
L. Arnold charging him with maintaining a public nuisance
and seeking an injunction against its continued operation.
He was called as Plaintiff's first witness. He testified that
he had lived on the property w her :e the piggery is maintained for forty years (T. 5, Line 5); that he had been raising some pigs on the property for 26 or 27 years; that his
operation had incfleased over the past f.ew years over what
it had been at earlier times (T. 5, Line 9 through 17); that
the operation was also solely for his benefit and "therie is
nobody else benefits by it whatsoever, only me" (T. 8, Line
28). Upon cross examination, Mr. Baker attempted to identify Defendant's proposed Exhibit "A", which was a Warranty Deed dated in the y:ear 1967, conveying Htle to the
real property upon which the piggery is operated, to his
sons Norris K. Arnold and Jon R. Arnold. An objection to
the proposed exhibit was sustained on grounds that it was
not material (T. 14).
8

Mr. Barker then made a proffer of proof that the Defendants Norris K. Arnold and Jon R. Arnold were in fact the
operators of the piggery, and that they were the real parties
in interest. Thereupon the. Court recess,ed the matter for
five minutes and requested that Counsel consult with him in
Chambers. Since the matter of parties had not been specifically raised, the. Court discussed with Counsel the following
items: (1) If the two sons who claim to be in a partnership
and actually operate the piggery were present in Court. Mr.
Barker informed the Court they were. (2) If the two sons
had employed the services of Mr. Barker and assisted in the
defense. Mr. Barker informed the Court that this was the
case. (3) Whether Mr. Barker's defense w o u 1d be the
same or substantially the same and the witnesses would be
the same if the two Defend ants were in the case. Mr. Barker answered this question in the affirmative. The Court's
attention is invited to Findings of Fact No. 2 and 3, to
which no obj,ection has been taken.
The Court reconv,ened and a motion was made to join Defendants Norris K. Arnold and Jon R. Arnold as additional
parties. Mr. Barker objected to any joinder at this stage in
the proceedings (T. 16, Line 21). The Court requested that
Mr. Barker show him wher,eby he would be prejudiced (T.
lG, Line 26). Mr. Barker offered no showing that his
clients would be prejudiced in any manner and requested
only that his objection be noted. Thereupon, the motion to
join the additional parttes was grant e d (T. 17, Line 1
through 15). In the proceedings Norris K. Arnold, one of
the added Defendants, testified that he and his brother, Jon
R. Arnold, were the ones who engaged couns,el to defend the
action (T. 135, Line 23 through 25), and also that he had
be.en contacted as soon as the complaint had been served
(T. 15, Line 27). He acknowledged assisting the pr.eparation of the exhibits which were introduced or attempted to
be introduced, (T. 97 and 98). He and presumably his
brother, Jon, had visited various spots in Monroe. City and
taken pictures of all of them in preparing the defense to be
9

asserted and introduced in proposed Exhibit "F" (T. 98,
Line 9).
The Defendants wer.e not prejudiced by the order joining
additional parties. The very purpose of Rule 21, Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure was served and all of the issues w ere
clearly befo:r:e the Court.
It is seen that the added Defendants personally appeared
in the action and took part in the proceedings after t he
Court had ruled that they were to be added as a party. In
this manner they voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction
of the Court. The permitted joinder of the additional partiies
allowed the Defendants to introduce into evidence the Warranty Deed covering the property involved; the income tax
returns for prior Y1ears showing the investment which was
made in the property by the added Defendants. If the Court
had refused to join the additional parties, these items would
have been immaterial and the Defendant Chades L. Arnold
would have been prohibited from showing any investment in
the property or resulting damage to him if the Court enjoined him from maintaining a public nuisance and enter1ed
an order requiring him to abate it. However, the added Defendants voluntarily continued with the cause and argued
to the Court that their investment should be considered to
mitigate a permanent injunction.
Objection has been made to the jurisdiction of the Court
over the added Defendants. Summons and complaint were
not served upon the added Defendants but they were joined
by amendment at the time of trial. There may have been
some basis for the Defendants' argument had the added Defendants then not proceeded with the def.ens.e thereby submitting to the jurisdiction of the Court. The only possible
prejudice which could have come to the added Defendants
would have been the possibility of lack of time to prepare a
defense. This was not asserted at any time and was in fact
negatived by the defense which was presented at the hearing. No request was .ever made for a continuance for this
purpose.

10

The granting of a motion to bring in additional parties to
an action is not a matter of right but rather one of discretion and the order should not be disturbed unless abuse of
discretion is shown. 3
POINT III
ABATEMENT OF THE HOG RANCH AND AN
INJUNCTION AGAINST ITS OPERATION WAS
AN AUTHORIZED AND NEEDED REMEDY.
We agree that injunctive relief is proper only to restrain
the inflicting of substantial, serious and irreparable damages, and where there is no adequate remedy at law.
The facts of this cas,e dramatize the need for that injunction. All of the testimony show that the relief granted by
the District Court was the only practical solution to the
problem of the inhabitants of Monroe City. The condition
created and maintained by the Def,endants was causing the
neighbors in the residential area serious losses of the use of
their own properties.
The odors wer1e described as sour-sickening, nauseating
and embarrassing (T. 87; 27-30; 39; 54; 62; 77; and 79).
Travelers passing on city str·eets adjacent to the hog ranch
were r.equired to roll up their windows. Residents could not
enjoy their homes and it became impossibl,e to use their
yards for recveational purposes and particularly for eating
or picnicking. One young girl found it exceedingly embarrassing if she had boyfriends call at her home (T. 72). The
nois.e prev,ented some neighbors from sleeping at night and
the residents were exposed to constant health hazards from
flies and dead animals. The sight of the manure piles, dead
pigs, burning of flies and afterbirth w,ere r.epulsive to the
sense of sight.
3

Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure
Vol. 2, Page 223
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A review of these facts leave only one practical solution
and that solution was reached by the District Court.
The Defendants attempted to hav1e admitted evidence conerning oher conditions in Monroe City which may hav1e constituted a nuisance.
The District Court correctly excluded that evidence and
particularly part of Exhibit "E" and the ~explanation thereof
and the slide photographs and Exhibit "F" with a holding
that the possibility of other nuisances existing in Monroe
City would not excuse and authorize the Defendants to continue a nuisance.1
No foundation was laid to show that any of the odors,
sights or sounds could have been coming from the areas
proposed to be shown to the Court from the slides contained
in Exhibit "F". No foundation was offered to connect the
location sought to be shown to the problem before the Court.
The evidence was overwhelming that the nuisance complained of was extreme and could not be tolerated in any setting.
The Defendants argue that the injunction order of the
Court is too harsh and that the Court should hav.e considel'led some other remedy w hi c h would in fact reduce the
nuisance.. This matter was argued before the Court and I
am certain considered. The Court's view of the premises
and consideration of the facts appeared to leave only one
practical solution. It was shown that the sanitary method
proposed by the Defendants of adding additional cement
flooring in an entir.e corral was considered when the Court
observ,ed that the farrowing pens are now covered w i th
cement. The cement actually contributes to and inc~eases
the obnoxious condition rather than abates it. Urine is able
1

See Ludlow et al. vs. Colo. Animal By-Products Co., 104 U
22; 137 P2d 347. Mere fact that condition may already
exist which may be obnoxious to some persons does not
create a lioense for establishment of other more offensive
conditions.
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to accumulate on the cement and is requir.ed to evaporate
rather than be taken into the soil or into a gravel surface.
The manure and other accumulation are then required to be
washed periodically. The water soaks up the material and
washes it on to ground adjacent to the cement floor (T. 22,
23). It would be reasonable to find that the cemented condition actually increases the nuisance problem, although it
may have some saluatory ;effects so far as hog raising is
concerned.
The District Judge has had before him income tax returns
and depreciation schedules which showed the investment
and operation of the Defendants. He heard the testimony
of Norris K. Arnold that the total investment of the Defendants was approximately $20,000.00 in the pig breeding
operation. He observed that the majority of the investment was in pigs and b!'leeding stock which could be readily
moved. An additional portion of the inv.estment was also
in chattels which could be readily moved. The financial loss,
if any results, to the Defendants for moving the hogs would
be nominal compared to the damag.e being caused daily to
residents of Monroe City.
CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit the judgment and order of the
trial Court should be affirmed on appeal.
OLSEN AND CHAMBERLAIN
By Tex R. Olsen
Attorney for Respondent
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